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3Introduction 
In  1865, the United States  just finished one of its most bloody wars1 and the country 
was beginning to adopt Constitutional Amendments and enforcement legislation which would 
grant black Americans long denied political and civil rights.    While many Americans are 
familiar with the southern “Rebel” states signing onto the Thirteenth,2 Fourteenth3 and  
Fifteenth4 Amendments as a condition to their rejoining the Union, many people do not know 
that one year later the  Cherokee, Seminole, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek Nations were  
signing treaties5 granting their ex-slaves civil rights and membership to last for generations   in 
order to reestablish government to government relations with the United States.     
 Background
These newly freed black men and women referred to as Freedmen 6 have coexisted with 
 
1 Civil War began in 1861 and ended 1865.  
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
3 U.S. CONST. amend.  XIV. 
4 U.S. CONST. amend.  XV. 
5 See  Treaty with the Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 1, 14 Stat. 755; Treaty 
with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty with the 
Creeks, June 14, 1866, U.S.-Creek Nat., art. 1, 14 Stat. 785; Treaty with the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw, Apr. 28, 1866, U.S.-Choctaw Nat. and Chickasaw Nat., art. 1, 14 Stat. 769. 
6See  Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 ( W.D.Okla. 2002)(explaining that after 
their emancipation former slaves and Blacks that were not enslaved, were called Freedmen).  
4their respective tribes for generations.7 In many cases, they intermarried and fought wars 
together against encroaching white settlement.8 Many escaped slaves from white plantations 
were protected by the tribes and the tribes often used the ex-slaves as translators when dealing 
with white Americans, and the Spanish.9 However, the tribes also adopted their own form of 
 
In this paper the author will refer to Blacks in the tribes before the Civil War as “Africans” 
because they were not citizens of the United States.  The author will also refer to the Freedmen 
by the tribes they belong to, for example Cherokee Freedmen, or Black Cherokee.  
7See Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (W.D. Okla. 2002) (explaining the 
extensive history between Africans and the Seminole Tribe); see also DANIEL F. LITTLEFIELD 
JR., AFRICANS AND SEMINOLES: FROM REMOVAL TO EMANCIPATION 4-6 (1977) (noting runaway 
slaves and several Indian Nations began settlements in Florida in the 1700’s); WILLIAM LOREN 
KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERITAGE 50 (1986)(describing early relationships between 
Africans and Indian Nations); Natsu Taylor Saito, Articles &Essays: From Slavery and 
Seminoles to Aids in South Africa: An essay on race and property in international law, 45 Vill. 
L. Rev. 1135,  1144 (2000) (citing) Kenneth W. Porter, The Black Seminoles: History of a 
Freedom-Seeking People (Alcione M. Amos & Thomas P. Senter ed. & rev.) (1996) [hereinafter 
Saito](explaining that  early Seminoles consisted of Africans and Native Americans).  
8 See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 4-6, 7. 
9 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-68(noting Black Seminoles assimilated and fought with 
Seminole Tribe). See  also Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455, 458 (1933) (stating 
the African population among the Seminole Tribe was very large and intermarriage was 
common, also noting that Africans were very important and recognized allies of the Tribe); 
KATZ, supra note 7, at 60 (noting during the Seminole wars both Indians and African fought 
5African slavery.10 The system of slavery varied among the tribes.11 While some tribes mirrored 
the white plantation owners, others had a system more like feudalism.12 African members were 
so engrained in tribal culture and identity that when the United States began to systematically 
remove southeastern tribes to eastern Oklahoma,13 many of the African members, enslaved or 
free, went with them.14 
together to resist the US advances); LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 7 (describing the Patriot War 
of 1812 as the first significant alliance between Seminoles and Africans).  
10 See id. at 5. 
11 See id. (comparing Seminole and Creeks system of slavery noting that the Creek system 
mirrored the system of white slave owners). Id. at 5-6, 8 (describing Seminole system as more 
lax, because  slaves could own property and build their own homes). The Seminole slaves were 
more incorporated into Seminole life and culture; they dressed as Seminoles spoke the language 
of the Tribe, and were often used as translators for the Tribe when dealing with white people. Id. 
See also DANIEL F. LITTLEFIELD JR., THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN: FROM EMANCIPATION TO 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 8-9 (1978)[ hereinafter CHEROKEE FREEDMEN](concluding that slavery 
among the Cherokees was much like that of white Southerners). 
12 See  LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 8 (explaining that many slaves owned by Seminoles owned 
property but had to pay tribute to their masters). 
13 See  Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (describing Seminoles participation in the “Trail of 
Tears,” the forced migration of Southeastern tribes from the eastern coast to Oklahoma); See 
generally Josephine Johnston, Resisting Genetic Identity: The Black Seminoles and Genetic Tests 
of Ancestry 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 262 (2003)(explaining that the black Indians were too 
difficult to separate from the tribe and eventually went with them to Oklahoma).   
6Despite the long history of coexistence between Africans and the tribes, Africans did not 
become official members of the tribes until after the Civil War.15 During the Civil War, the Five 
Civilized Tribes16 (Choctaw, Cherokee, Seminole, Creek, and Chickasaw) fought for the 
Confederacy.17 After the war, the United States made the tribes sign treaties assuring their 
allegiance.18 Along with promising peace, the tribes abolished all forms of slavery and 
 
14 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (noting that Africans were forcibly removed with the tribes  
from Florida to Oklahoma between 1838 and 1842); See  also LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 4 
(noting that between 1838 and 1843 nearly five hundred Africans moved with the Seminole 
Tribe from Florida to Oklahoma). 
15 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (asserting that formal recognition of Freedmen’s 
membership in the Seminole Nation occurred through a Treaty signed in 1866).  
16 The author could not find the origins of the term “Five Civilized Tribes.” 
17 See Seminole Nation, 78 Ct. Cl. at 459(acknowledging Five Civilized tribes treaty with the 
Confederacy); LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 182. See generally, H. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-1, pt.3 at 
345. (1861)(quoting Henry M. Rector, then governor of Arkansas,  to John Ross, Chief of the 
Cherokees, “You people, in their institutions, productions, latitude, and natural sympathies are 
allied to the…slaveholding State… .Our people and yours are allies in war, and friends in 
peace.”). 
18 See Treaty with the Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 1, 14 Stat. 755; Treaty 
with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty with the 
Creeks, June 14, 1866, U.S.-Creek Nat., art. 1, 14 Stat. 785; Treaty with the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw, Apr. 28, 1866, U.S.-Choctaw Nat. and Chickasaw Nat., art. 1, 14 Stat. 769. 
7involuntary servitude unless for the punishment of a crime.19 They were also required to make 
their former slaves official members of their tribes, and afford them the same rights as their non-
African members.20 
19 See  Treaty with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755; Treaty with 
the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty with the Creeks, 
June 14, 1866, U.S.-Creek Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 785; Treaty with Choctaw and Chickasaw, Apr. 
28, 1866, U.S.-Choctaw Nat. and Chickasaw Nat., art. 2, 14 St. 769. 
20 See Treaty with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755 
 And inasmuch as there are among the Seminoles many persons of African descent 
and blood… it is stipulated that hereafter these persons and their descendants, and 
such others of the same race shall be permitted by said nation to settle there, shall 
have and enjoy all the rights of the native citizens, and the laws of said nation 
shall be equally binding upon all persons of whatever race or color, who may be 
adopted as citizens or members of said Tribe. Id. 
see also Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799 (“They 
further agree that all freedmen who have been liberated… as well as all free colored persons who 
were in the country… are now residents therein, or who may return in six months, and their 
descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees…”) 
 Treaty with the Creeks, June 14, 1866, U.S.-Creek Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 785  
[I]nasmuch as there are among the Creeks many persons of African descent…it is 
stipulated that hereafter these persons lawfully residing in Creek country…and 
their descendants and such others of the same race as may be permitted… to settle 
within… the Creek Nation as citizens shall have an enjoy all the rights and 
8While a majority of the tribes that held slaves21 acquiesced with the treaties’ stipulations, 
the Freedmen’s rights varied. While some tribes allowed full political participation, others 
 
privileges of native citizens, including an equal interest in the soil and national 
funds, and the laws of the said nation shall be equally binding upon and give 
equal protection to all such persons, and all others, of whatsoever race or color, 
who may be adopted as citizens or members of said Tribe. Id. 
 
Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, Apr. 28, 1866, U.S.-Choctaw Nat. and Chickasaw Nat., 
art. 2, 14 Stat. 769. 
[T]hree hundred thousand dollars, will be held…[until the] legislatures of the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations respectively shall have made such laws, rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to give all persons of African descent, 
residents… and their descendants, heretofore held in slavery among said nations, 
all the rights, privileges, and immunities, including the right of suffrage, of 
citizens of said nations, except in the annuities, moneys’ and public domain claim 
by or belonging to said nations respectively. Id. 
See also Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (confirming that ancestors of the Africans were to have 
all the rights of native citizens). 
21 The Author is not exactly sure how many tribes owned slaves; however, some case law has 
alluded to the fact that tribes outside of the Five Civilized Tribes had a system of slavery. See  
Jackson v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 441, 445 (1899)  (holding that the at the time of the 
Thirteenth Amendment was passed government officials were negotiating treaties with several 
tribes including, the Dwamish, Skallams, and Makahs, to abolish slavery). 
9continually pushed to have their ex-slaves removed.22 The Chickasaw and Choctaw nations 
fought the adoption of their Freedmen for many years.23 
22 See  Chickasaw Freedmen v. Choctaw Nation and the Chickasaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115 
(1904)(explaining the many request from the Choctaw Nation to have the United States remove 
their Freedmen); See  also LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 203 (comparing the rights of Freedmen 
in the tribes). While the ex-slaves had no rights under with the Chickasaw Tribe, they faired 
slightly better with the Choctaw Tribe, the Cherokee Tribe was able to exclude many ex-slaves 
due to a stipulation in their treaty which limited access to full rights to only those ex-slaves 
which returned to the reservation within six months. Id. The Creeks allowed the ex-slaves to full 
rights, but eventually political strife unsettled the Nation for years, the Seminoles were the only 
Tribe where ex-slaves had full rights of citizens.  Id. at 191. Racism within the Chickasaws, 
Choctaws, and Cherokee tribes was more invidious when compared with the Creeks and even 
more so when compared to the Seminoles. Id. See  CHEROKEE FREEDMEN supra note 11, at 63 
(citing S. REP. NO. 45-744 at 591 (1883),  (acknowledging that the Freedmen voted in Cherokee 
elections); Id. at 51 (describing Freedmen prosperity within the Cherokee Nation noting 
Freedmen owned barbershops, blacksmith shops, general stores and restaurants). 
23 See Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. 115 at 124 (concluding that the Chickasaw Freedmen 
were never adopted into the nation or acquired any rights dependent on such adoption); Id. 
(finding that the Indian nations would rather refuse rights for the freedmen than take $300,000 
for the succession of their land);  See also LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 203 (noting that the 
Seminoles Creeks and Cherokees adopted their ex-slaves immediately while the Choctaws 
resisted until 1885 and the Chickasaws refused). 
10
 Currently, two of those tribes are caught in an ongoing struggle between their “full 
blood” members and their members of African descent.24 The Seminole and Cherokee tribes 
have taken several measures to remove their Freedmen from the tribes thus denying them   
access to federally funded programs,25 monies, and the right to vote in tribal elections.26 
The Freedmen filed suit to contest this discrimination, but courts have continually 
dismissed the suits because of tribal sovereignty.27 In some cases, the Freedmen sued the federal 
government for allowing the tribes to disenfranchise them.28 However, the courts dismissed the 
suits because tribes are indispensable parties29 that cannot be joined because they are sovereign 
entities.30 
24 See  infra, Parts II.A, II.B. 
25 The term “federally funded program” defines but is not limited to programs federal monies for 
education, elderly services, and daycare programs. 
26 See  infra, Part II. 
27 See generally  Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164; see also Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F. 2d 1457 
(10th Cir. 1989). 
28 See  generally Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164. 
29 See  FED. R. CIV. P. RULE 19(b)(explaining that once a party is deemed indispensable the 
action should be dismissed); See also Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medial Center, 
94 F.3d 1401, 1411 (“An indispensable party is one who has such and interest in the subject 
matter of the controversy that a final decree cannot be rendered between the other parties to the 
suit without affecting his interest…”). 
30 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
11
 This Comment discusses whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s bar against the “badges 
and incidents of slavery”31 abrogates tribal sovereignty so that the Freedmen can sue a tribe in 
federal court. Part I tribal sovereignty and the important role it serves as a protection against 
encroaching state laws.32 Part II discusses two cases studies highlighting the current 
disenfranchisement of the Freedmen and the current legal battles involving the United State 
government and the Cherokee and Seminole Nations.33 Part III briefly discusses the courts 
opposition to applying civil rights legislation within the tribes to protect tribal members due to 
tribal sovereignty.34 Due to the difficulty of  suing the government to protect the Freedmen and 
the courts opposition to allowing  suits with civil rights legislation Part IV will recommend that 
the Thirteenth Amendment as a possible means to abrogate tribal sovereignty to protect the 
Freedmen..35 After briefly analyzing the how courts have limited and expanded the scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s bar against the “badges and incidents of slavery” with regard to 
sovereign entities including Native American tribes, Part IV will 36 demonstrate how the 
Freedmen can use the Thirteenth Amendment as a limited waiver of tribal sovereignty because 
the current disenfranchisement constitutes a “badge or incident of slavery.”37 Part IV will also 
 
31 See infra, note 212 (noting the phrase “badges of slavery/servitude” came about during 
Congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment). 
32 See infra, Part I, and accompanying text. 
33 See infra, Part II.A-B,  and accompanying text. 
34 See infra, Part III, and accompanying text. 
35 See infra, Part IV,and accompanying text. 
36 See infra, Part IV, and accompanying text. 
37 See infra, Part V,  and accompanying text. 
12
argue that the expansion of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban against the “badges and incidents of 
slavery” to reach the tribes, will not dilute tribal sovereignty because courts can distinguish the 
Freedmen’s claim from prior case law, thus narrowly tailoring an exception to allow for their 
claim.38 
II.  Tribal Sovereignty
A.  Sovereign Immunity Generally
The concept of sovereign immunity has firm roots in Anglo American common law.39 
However, it was not until 1821 that the Supreme Court applied the concept to the United States 
government.40 Sovereign immunity is grounds for dismissal and has been used over the years to 
defend sovereign entities from suit. 41As a sovereign entity, the United States is immune from 
suit unless it grants consent to be sued.42 Congress may waive the immunity of the federal 
 
38 See infra, Part V, and accompanying text. 
39 Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 5-6, n.15 (1963) (tracing sovereign immunity to Thirteenth century England, noting the 
king “was not subject to the enforcement of the law or the judicial process). 
40 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6. Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821) (holding that “the universally 
received opinion… that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States). 
41 See generally Maricopa County v. Valley Nat. bank of Phoenix, 18 U.S. 357(1943)(finding 
that no suit against property in which the U.S. has an interest can be maintained); Feres v. United 
states 340 U.S. 135 (1950)(finding that the U.S. cannot be sued for injuries received by service 
members incident to service); Seminole v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that states are 
protected by the Eleventh Amendment from suit). 
42 See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 412. 
13
government, but the waiver must be given expressly and explicitly.43 States, like the federal 
government, enjoy the privilege of sovereign immunity.44 Unlike federal sovereign immunity, 
state sovereign immunity can be found in the U.S. Constitution under the Eleventh 
Amendment.45 State sovereign immunity is absolute and unqualified unless it is waived by 
Congress or by the State.46 Congress must waive a State’s sovereign immunity with a clear 
expression to do so.47 
43 See United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 6 (finding that statutory waiver was not unequivocally 
expressed); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654,670 (1996)(finding congressional waiver). 
44 See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, (1991); Seminole, v. Florida, 
517 U.S. at 54.  
45 See  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. (“The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see also Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding the Eleventh Amendment does not only stand for what it 
says but also that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact); Blatchford,
501 U.S. 775, 781 (holding that Eleventh Amendment protected States from suit from an Indian 
Tribe). 
46 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55; Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786. 
47 See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55 (also finding that statutory waiver must be clear and within the 
authority of Congress to do so); Blatchford, 501 U.S. 786 (finding Congress must make intent to 
abrogate unmistakably clear); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)(waiver must be 
unmistakably clear); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)( 
(holding that a state is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983). 
14
 B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Courts have recognized tribal sovereignty for many years. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief 
Justice John Marshall, held that, Indian Nations “have always been considered as distinct 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil.”48 Chief Justice Marshall confirmed the Cherokee tribe’s sovereignty by 
finding that all regulation and intercourse with the tribe was exclusively for the federal 
government.49 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall, protected from tribes from state encroachment 
because as sovereign nations their regulation and intercourse like other sovereign nations is 
strictly within the jurisdiction of the federal government.50 However, the tribe’s status as a 
sovereign entity does not automatically allow it to sue other sovereign entities such as the 
States.51 
48 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
49 Id. at 558-59. 
50 Id. at 561. (“The Cherokee Nation…is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force… The whole 
intercourse…[with] …this nation is vested in the government of the United States.”); see also 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 
(1991)(finding state tax didn’t apply to the tribe.) 
51 See  Blackford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991) (finding that the Tribe’s 
sovereignty did not defeat the Eleventh Amendment protection of Alaska). 
15
 As sovereign entities tribes possess many of the same inherent powers as States, and the 
federal government,52 including immunity from suit.53 Tribal immunity has prevented many 
people and entities from suing a tribe, by denying the petitioning party jurisdiction in a federal 
court.54 This leaves the petitioning party with no other recourse besides litigating in tribal court.55 
Only Congress or the tribe itself can waive tribal sovereign immunity.56 However, Congress’ 
 
52 See Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897)(finding that Indian tribes have “the power to make 
their own substantive law in internal matters.”); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) 
(holding that tribes have the abilities to make their own laws and be ruled by them.) 
53 See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919) (finding Indian tribes are not liable to 
suit because they are sovereign entities). 
54 See, e.g., Davis 199 F. Supp. at 1179; Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F. 2d 1457 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Florida Paraplegic Ass’n., 166 
F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999); Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, (11th Cir. 2001). 
55 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (finding that internal matters 
concerning the Tribe are to be litigated in tribal court); but see Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 
(“Although the Black Seminoles may seek to have their…claim heard on the merits through the 
Tribe’s legislative or judicial bodies, the Court recognizes the reality of these options. The Court 
finds it will be futile for the Black Seminoles to seek adjudication in these tribal forums.”).  
56 See  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc. 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1988)( an “Indian Tribe is subject to suit only where  
Congress has authorized the suit or the Tribe has waived its immunity”). 
16
abrogation of a Tribe’s sovereignty must be unmistakably clear.57 A waiver of sovereign 
immunity can not be implied.58 Thus, specific tribal rights will not be deemed to have been 
abrogated or limited absent a “clear and plain” congressional intent.59 Congress can demonstrate 
a “clear and plain” intent by express declaration in the statute, the legislative history, or the 
“surrounding circumstances.”60 Sovereign immunity is an integral part of protecting the tribes 
from suit.61 However, tribal sovereign immunity is not a defense to suit from the United States.62 
If a tribe is subject to damages, the tribe’s ability to carry out governmental duties could be 
impaired, because of great economic losses.63 This could result in devastating effects on a tribal 
community, as noted by a tribal court judge: 
Critically important community interests are being  protected by this immunity: 
Suits against the tribe  seeking damages attack the community treasury. This 
money belongs to all the people of the … nation. It  must be guarded against the 
attacks of individuals so that it can be used for the good of all in the tribal 
community. Secondly, any suit against the tribe forces the tribe to expend 
 
57 See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58; EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip., 986 F. 2d 246, 249 (8th 
Cir. 1993); Florida Paraplegic Ass’n., 166 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1999). 
58 See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58. 
59 Id. 
60 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986). 
61 See Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native 
American tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 Ariz. St. L.J. 681, 687 
(1994). 
62 See U.S. v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1987). 
63 See  id. (citing Ralph W. Johnson & James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal 
Law, 12  AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 170-71 (1984)). 
17
community monies in legal fees. The possible amounts that can be  expended on 
this effort would be great if suits of this nature are not limited. Finally, the entire 
community stands to suffer irreparable harm if their leaders foreseeing possible 
liabilities at every action, are unable to fulfill the responsibility of their offices.64 
Tribal sovereign immunity is one of the few protections left to the tribes that ensures 
tribes will remain distinct nations and prevent further dilution of culture and way of life 
due to encroaching state and federal law. However, it can be abused by tribe when used 
to insulate tribes from suit while tribal leaders discriminate against their members.  
III. Current Disenfranchisement
Currently, both the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 
are disenfranchising their black members. In both cases, the Freedmen are being denied access to 
federally funded programs, monies, and voting rights on account of race. The Seminole Nation 
of Oklahoma is also denying their Freedmen access to funds that were awarded to the tribe for 
land taken in the 1800’s.65 At the root of today’s disenfranchisement is the Dawes Commission’s 
 
64 See  Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal C. Rep. A-51, A-54 (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. 1980). 
65 See Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169;   William, Glaberson, Who Is A 
Seminole And Who Gets To Decide? N.Y. Times  Jan. 29, 2001 at A1; See also, Ben Fenwick, 
Racial Strife Splits American Indian Tribe at  
http://www.citiznesalliance.org/The%20Hicks%20Fix/ 
Full%20Sovereignty.htm (July 3, 2002)(last visited Oct. 16, 2004); Brian Scaper, Seminole To 
Refile Lawsuit: Black Seminoles Say They Are Being Discriminated Against By Their Tribe, The 
Oklahoma Daily at http://www.oudaily.com/vnews/ 
display.v/ART/2004/07/14/40f4805e559f9?in_archive=1 (July 14, 2004) (last visited Oct. 16, 
2004).  
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assignment of tribal membership in the early 1900’s.66 The Dawes Commission was set up by 
Congress to determine and record the membership of several Indian tribes.67 The Commission 
categorized the tribes’ membership on two rolls, one for full blooded Indians the “Blood Roll,” 
and the other for former slaves, the “Freedmen Roll.”68 The Dawes Commission did not bother 
to quantify the percentage of Native American blood in the Freedmen.69 Many historians believe 
that a majority Freedmen were of mixed heritage.70 The Commission essentially applied a “one 
 
66 See Act of June, 28, 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-504, § 21, 30 Stat. 495(1898), (declaring that tribal 
enrollment as completed by the Dawes Commission and approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior, has the effect of designating people and their descendants as  tribal members). 
67 See Curtis Act, Pub. L. 55-517 30 Stat. 503, (June 28, 1898) 
 Commission shall make such rolls descriptive of the persons thereon, so that they 
may be thereby identified, and it is authorized to take a census of each said 
tribes…The rolls so made, when approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall 
be final, and the persons whose name are found thereon with their descendants… 
shall alone constitute the several tribes which they represent. Id. 
 See also Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455, 466-467 (explaining Dawes 
Commission established in 1893 and in 1896 was granted powers from Congress to determine 
citizens of the tribe). 
68 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168; Press Release, Legal Defense Fund for Cherokee 
Freedmen Established (August 2003) [hereinafter LDF Press Release] at http://www.african-
nativeamerican.com/fund.htm. 
69 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.  
70 Id. 
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drop”71 rule to the Freedmen, thereby concluding that any drop of black blood would override 
any Indian ancestry. Ironically, people who had three quarters white blood got full blood status 
in the Seminole and Cherokee Nations.72 This was arguably to preserve the purity of white 
blood. Also Native Americans of other tribes, adopted into the Cherokee Nation were enrolled in 
the “Blood Rolls.”73 Today, the Dawes Rolls are considered the ultimate authority for 
determination of membership in both the Seminole and Cherokee Tribe.74 
A. Seminole Tribe
In 1823, the Seminole Tribe ceded its land in Florida to the United States.75 The tribe did 
not receive compensation for this land until 1976.76 The tribe received 56 million dollars, 
 
71 See Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, THE NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, 46, 48 (defining 
the one-drop rule as an "American institution known informally as 'the one-drop rule,' which 
defines as black a person with as little as a single drop of 'black blood.' This notion derives from 
a long-discredited belief that each race had its own blood type, which was correlated with 
physical appearance and social behavior.") 
72 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1168; See also LDF Press Release supra note 68.   
73 See Id. 
74 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1169, LDF Press Release supra note 68. 
75 See  Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (citing Seminole Nation of Fla. and Seminole Nation of 
Okla. v. United States, 387 Ind. Cl. Comm. (Dockets 73 and 151) (1976)(finding the Seminole 
Tribe should be compensated  $16 million dollars ($56 million with interest) for lands ceded in 
1823). 
76 Id. 
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commonly referred to as the “Judgment Fund.”77 In 1990, Congress passed a distribution act78 
which set forth the use and distribution criteria of the Judgment Fund.79 Nowhere in the act did 
Congress express or imply any intent that the Freedmen be excluded from the funds.80 The 
Freedmen’s economic need is very much like that of their full blood counterparts.81 Despite this, 
both the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“B.I.A.”) and the Seminole Tribe sought to exclude the 
 
77 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. 
78 Indian Claims Distribution of Funds to Seminole Indians, 104 Stat. 143 (1990). 
79 See  Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71  (noting that eighty percent of the funds were to be set 
aside to fund  common tribal needs, such as  elderly assistance, higher education and household 
education assistance) ; see also Martha Melaku, Note, Seeking Acceptance: Are the Black 
Seminoles Native Americans? Sylvia Davis v. The United States of America 27 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 539, 548 (2002)(noting the funds were to be distributed to fund several community projects 
for the elderly and children). 
80 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. Id. at 1172-73 (noting that Tim Vollman, Regional 
Solicitor, Southwest Region, expressed several doubts that Congress intended to exclude the 
Freedmen because Congress did not explicitly say so, and the language did use included the 
Black Seminoles.) 
81 See John Keilman, Bloodlines Drawn Over Money; With Millions In Federal Compensation 
Funds At Stake; Oklahoma’s Seminole Indian Descendants Find Themselves In A Fight Over 
Tribal Roots, CHI. TRIB. Apr. 4, 2002 at p. 1. (“There is little doubt that many black Seminoles, 
like their blood neighbors, are in dire need. One short stretch of dirt road…is an outpost of 
trailers known as ‘the hood’ by some black Seminoles. The poverty is deadening.”). 
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Freedmen from the Judgment Fund.82 The B.I.A. was aware that the Freedmen were citizens of 
the Tribe83 and that Congress was unlikely to approve of a plan that would exclude the 
Freedmen.84 
On June 28, 1990, Chief Jerry Haney of the Seminole Tribe and Ross Swimmer former 
Constitutional Chief of the Cherokee Nation, discussed ways in which to  exclude the Freedmen 
from the Judgment Fund.85 They reasoned that because the Freedmen were not officially citizens 
 
82 See Id., 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (noting that the B.I.A. issued a Research report advising 
Congress not to include the Black Seminoles in the Judgment Fund disbursement). 
83 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (noting that the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. 
Constitution provided that membership consists of “all Seminole citizens whose names appear on 
the final rolls of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma). This would actually include the Freedmen 
because they were recorded on their own roll of membership for the Tribe.; see also supra notes 
38-40 (describing the Commission’s way of recording the Freedmen on the rolls). 
84 See  Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (citing memorandum from Rosella C. Garbow, B.I.A. 
Tribal Operations Officer,(May 4, 1990))  (“we sincerely believe that should a plan be submitted 
to Congress that excludes the Seminole Freedmen, who are currently members of the Tribe, a 
joint resolution will be enacted by Congress disapproving such a plan.”). 
85 See  Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (referring to June 28, 1990 telephone conversation 
between Chief Jerry Haney and Ross Swimmer, witnessed by Rosella Garbow, B.I.A. Tribal 
Operations Officer). 
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of the tribe in 1823, they could not benefit from the transfer of the land.86 As property in 1823,87 
the Freedmen arguably could not partake in the communal ownership of the land.88 Therefore, 
they concluded, that the Freedmen should not participate in the communal compensation for it.89 
Ultimately, the Tribe voted to exclude the Freedmen by passing the “Seminole Nation Usage 
 
86 See  Id. See also Treaty with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S.-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755;  
but see  Saito supra note 7 at 1144 ( explaining that from the beginning the Seminole tribe has 
had Africans living among them). 
87 See  Saito supra  note 7 at 1144-55 (summarizing the conflict over African slaves between 
Seminole tribe and white settlers in 1823.) By the time the treaty was signed whites planters 
were demanding that the Seminoles  be “active and vigilant in preventing… the passing through 
of… any absconding slaves…”) Id. at 1153.  This requirement assured that certain people would 
be treated as property.  Id.  However there was much confusion over who was actually and 
escape slave because “Seminole society had blacks at every status-born free, or the descendants 
of fugitives, or perhaps fugitives themselves, …interpreters, advisers of importance, others were 
warriors and hunters or field hands. Intermarriage further complicated black status.” See 
generally, Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856) (maintaining property status of 
African Americans because they were neither citizens of the United States and Constitution 
therefore did not apply them ) overruled by U.S. CONST. amend. XII, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
88 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. But see MELAKU supra note 80, at 549 (arguing Black 
Seminoles helped in the development and cultivation of the land and therefore are entitled to 
compensation along with the Tribe. 
89 Davis,199 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 
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Plan.”90 This plan required that a person must be descended from a member of the Seminole 
Nation as it existed in 1823, to receive any of the Judgment Fund.91 This excluded Freedmen, 
who did not become official members of the Seminole Nation until 1866.92 Congress approved 
the Seminole Nation Usage Plan on March 30, 1991.93 
On January 16, 1996, Sylvia Davis, a Freedmen, sought to gain access to the Judgment 
Fund.94 Instead of filing suit against the Tribe, Ms. Davis sought judgment against the B.I.A.95 
Ms. Davis did not join the tribe because the Tribe is a sovereign entity.96 The court granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party.97 The Tenth Circuit 
reversed and remanded, charging the District Court with deciding whether the Tribe was a 
necessary party or indispensable.98 If the tribe was merely necessary then the claims could 
proceed, however if they were indispensable the claims would be dismissed.99 In 2002, the court 
 
90 Id.  at 1170. 
91 Id. at 1172 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1173 
94 See Davis v. United States, 192 F. 3d 951 (10th Cir. 1999). 
95 Id. 
96 See Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (citing the holding of prior 1999 decision that the Nation 
could not be joined because of sovereign immunity). 
97 Id. 
98 See  192 F.3d at 961. 
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)“Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as 
described in …cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
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concluded once again that the tribe was an indispensable party.100 The court noted that remedy 
to the Freedmen was impossible without involving the Seminole Nation because it would involve 
their integral management of the Judgment Fund.101 The court did not rule on whether the 
Tribe’s specific actions of denying the Freedmen access to the Judgment Fund violated the 
Treaty of 1866 or rights of the Freedmen generally.  
 Consequently, after the 1996 suit was filed, the Seminole Nation sought to exclude all 
Freedmen from their Nation by amending the Tribe’s Constitution.102 On July 1, 2000, the Tribe 
passed a referendum to change the membership criteria.103 Previously, tribal membership 
required descent from an enrollee on the Dawes Rolls.104 The new resolution requires one eighth 
Seminole blood.105 In August 2000, the Tribe officially removed the Freedmen by amending 
 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the 
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.” 
100 Davis, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
101 Id. 
102 See  Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 122, 124 (W.D. Okla. 2002). 
103 See id. See also Seminole Voters Approve Changes, Indianz.com 
http://64.62.196.98/News/printme.asp?ID=law /772000-6 [hereinafter Seminole Voters](citing 
several Constitutional changes including the 1/8th blood quantum which would prove to 
disenfranchise the Freedmen) (posted July 7, 2000)(last viewed Oct. 16, 2004). 
104 See JOHNSTON, supra note 13. 
105 See Seminole Nation v. Norton, No. 00-2384, slip. op. at 4-5, (D.D.C Sept. 27, 
2001)(explaining the Sixth Amendment to the Seminole Constitution was “to require one eighth 
quantum of Seminole Indian blood to be a member of the Seminole Nation” and the seventh 
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their Constitution pursuant to the new resolution.106 However, pursuant to the Tribe’s original 
Constitution, the Department of Interior (“D.O.I.”), via the B.I.A had to approve all changes to 
their Constitution.107 To remove the B.I.A. oversight, the Tribe further amended the Constitution 
to exclude the provision concerning the federal government.108 The Tribe  never presented to the 
change to the B.I.A. for approval.109 
The B.I.A. refused to approve the amended Constitution because it would exclude the 
Freedman.110 The Nation filed suit in 2000 challenging the federal government’s authority to 
approve its Constitution.111 Concurrently, the Tribe held an election in compliance with the new 
Constitutional amendments.112 At this election, the tribe disenfranchised the Freedmen because it 
 
amendment, was to change the term “Seminole citizen” “Seminole Indian citizen by blood.”). 
See also Seminole Voters supra note 103(noting the change to 1/8th blood quantum). 
106 See FENWICK, supra note 65 (noting the Constitutional amendments officially removed the 
Freedmen from the Seminole Tribe). 
107 See Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 206 F.R.D. 1, 3  (D.D.C. 2001)(citing Article XIII of 
original Seminole Constitution). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See  Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(summarizing a September 29, 2000 letter from Kevin Grover, Assistant Secretary of 
Department of Interior [hereinafter D.O.I.] to Chief Haney, noting that he would not approve the 
amendments because they exclude the Freedmen). 
111 See id. at 125.  
112 Id. 
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no longer considered them members.113 Although the Freedmen cast ballots, their votes were not 
counted.114 A new Chief was elected.115 However, the B.I.A. refused to accept the results of the 
election.116 The Seminole Nation tried in two suits to repeal the government’s actions.117 First, 
the Nation tried to deny the federal government’s authority to approve amendments to their 
Constitution.118 The court disagreed with the Tribe and found that the D.O.I. had authority 
pursuant to the original Seminole Constitution.119 After the B.I.A. refused to recognize the 
Tribe’s election results, the Tribe filed suit again.120 The Tribe claimed that the continued refusal 
to recognize the new tribal government was inappropriate because the Tribe had taken initiatives 
to recognize full participation of the Freedmen in the General Council.121 Along with refusing to 
recognize the new leadership, the B.I.A. has frozen the distribution of the Judgment Fund to the 
 
113 Id. at 126. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (noting that Ken Chambers was elected under the new Constitutional provisions which 
defeated incumbent Chief Haney). 
116 See id. at 126, (noting the B.I.A.’s position to continually recognize Chief Haney as the 
Principal Chief of the Seminole Tribe despite recent tribal election results making Ken Chambers 
Principal Chief). 
117 See 206 F.R.D. 1; 223 F. Supp. 2d 122. 
118 See 206 F.R.D. at 5. 
119 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (citing 206 F.R.D. at 19). 
120 See 223 F. Supp. 2d 122.  
121 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
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Tribe.122 The court concluded that the continued refusal to recognize the Tribe’s government was 
not “arbitrary, capricious, or [outside] the accordance of the law.”123 The court reasoned that 
unlike prior case law,124 there was an “element of oppressive action on the part of the Seminole 
Tribe against its own minority members.”125 Also, that “the Secretary of the Interior is charged 
not only with the duty to protect the rights of the Tribe, but also the rights of individual 
members.”126 Therefore, this is a situation where the federal government has sought to protect 
minority members of the Tribe.127 Finally, the court noted that the Tribe’s discriminatory acts 
 
122 See KEILMAN, supra note 81, (noting that agencies have frozen the Judgment Fund and other 
payments; $30 million dollars of the judgment fund is still undistributed); see also FENWICK,
supra note 65 (noting the Judgment fund has been frozen). 
123 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 138. 
124 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 131-32 (citing Ransom v. Babitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149 (D.D.C 
1999); Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1143 (D.D.C 1976); Wheeler v. United States Dep’t 
of the Interior, 811 F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
125 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
126 See id; see also id. at 140 (“The D.O.I. has the authority and responsibility to ensure that the 
Nation’s representatives, with whom it must conduct government-to-government relations, are 
valid representatives of the Nation as a whole.”) (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 
U.S. 286, 296 (1942). 
127 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (“This is a situation where the D.O.I. has sought to protect 
minority members of the Tribe from the discriminatory actions of the overwhelming majority of 
the Tribe.”); see also Seminole Nation v. Norton, 206 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C 2001) (refusing to 
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“were in total disregard of the rights afforded to those members by the Treaty of 1866 and the 
Nation’s Constitution.”128 
Currently, the B.I.A. refuses to recognize the new government of the Seminole Nation.129 
It is important to note that the court did not restore the Freedmen any rights by allowing the 
federal government’s refusal to recognize the Tribe’s new leadership. The court merely assured 
that the federal government was the final check on a Tribe’s actions to amend its Constitution.130 
The courts also concluded that this power to check the tribes is a protection for the Freedmen.131 
However, as demonstrated in the next case study, the government does not have to choose to 
protect the Freedmen, and has allowed a Tribe to take away their voting rights and access to 
federal funds and programs. 
B. Cherokee Nation
Recently, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma prevented Black Cherokees from voting in 
the May 24, 2003 election.132 The tribe excluded the Cherokee Freedmen from membership, 
voting, and access to federally funded programs, by redefining tribal membership as being 
 
allow Freedmen to intervene because the D.O.I.’s arguments against approving the amendments 
essentially protected the Freedmen’s right to citizenship in the Seminole Nation). 
128 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 138. 
129 See id. See also, Keilman supra note 81. 
130 See 223 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
131 See 206 F.R.D. at 7.  
132 See Cherokee Freedmen caught in high-level dispute, Indianz.com at 
http://www.indianz.com/News/archives/000930.asp [hereinafter Cherokee Dispute] (Aug. 20, 
2003)(last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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traceable to blood instead of an ancestor on the Dawes Rolls.133 This definition of membership 
also prevents the Freedmen from accessing federal funds.134 The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 
also amended their Constitution to prevent the B.I.A.’s oversight in their election procedures.135 
The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma maintains that their actions are completely legal and 
distinguishable from those of the Seminole Nation because the Cherokees did not seek to amend 
their Constitution to directly oust their Freedmen.136 At present, the federal government agrees 
with the Cherokee tribe’s position. 
 
133 See LDF Press Release, supra note 68(describing new blood quantum for proof of 
membership); See also, Cherokee Freedmen Protest Election, The African-Native American 
History & Genealogy Webpage at http://www.african-nativeamerican.com/election.htm (July 31, 
2003). 
134 See  Letter from Jon Velie, Velie and Velie Attorney’s at Law, Norman Okla., to Aurene 
Smith, Acting Asst. Sect. of  Indian Affairs, Washington D.C. (June 10, 2003) (on file with Vann 
v. Norton, No. 03-1711, (filed Aug. 11, 2003 D.D.C)). 
135 See Cherokee Freedmen Protest Election, The African-Native American History & 
Genealogy Webpage at http://www.african-nativeamerican.com/election.htm (July 31, 2003). 
136 See  Letter from Lloyd Benton Miller, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Enderson & Perry LLP, 
Washington D.C., to Scott Keep, Esq., Office of the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, US. 
Dept. Int., Washington D.C. (explaining that the amendments “propose no change whatsoever to 
citizenship or voting rights….Again in contrast to the situation presented in Seminole Nation the 
proposed Cherokee Nation Constitutional Amendments to be considered…do not purport to 
disenfranchise any citizen in any manner whatsoever.”) (July 18, 2003)(on file with Vann v. 
Norton, 03-1711, filed Aug. 11, 2003 D.D.C)); but see  Letter from Hastings Shade, Deputy 
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 Like the Seminole Tribe case, the B.I.A. had a fiduciary responsibility to watch over the 
Cherokee Constitution.137 The 1976 Cherokee Constitution had a provision similar to the one in 
the Seminole Constitution, which said, “[N]o amendment or new Constitution shall become 
effective without the approval of the President of the United States or his authorized 
representative.”138 Unlike the Seminole situation, the Cherokee Tribe excluded that provision, by 
amending its Constitution in the May 24, 2003 election, in which the Freedmen were not allowed 
to vote.139 Initially, the B.I.A. denied the results of the election as it had in the Seminole 
situation.140 But unlike the Seminole case, the B.I.A. reversed its position, allowed the 
amendment, and certified the election results.141 
Chief Cherokee Nation and Stephanie Wickliffe-Shepard, Tribal Council Cherokee Nation, to 
Aurene Martin, Interim Assistant Sect. D.O.I, Washington D.C. (supporting the Freedmen’s 
position that the election excluded the Cherokee Freedmen because election procedures included 
the words “by blood”.) (Aug. 5, 2003)(on file with Vann v. Norton, 03-1711, filed Aug. 11, 2003 
D.D.C)). 
137 See Principal Chiefs Act, Pub. L. No. 91-495 (1970)(mandating that all procedures to elect 
the principal chiefs of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek  and Seminole as well as the governor of 
the Chickasaw Tribe of Oklahoma shall by subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior). 
138 See CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. XV, § 10 (removed by May 24, 2003 election). 
139 Cherokee Dispute supra note132.  
140 Letter from Jeanette Hanna, Acting Secretary of Indian Affairs, to Chadwick Smith, Principal 
Chief of Cherokee Nation to Chadwick (July 11, 2003) (on file with Vann v. Norton, 03-1711, 
filed Aug. 11, 2003 D.D.C)) (finding Cherokee situation too much like the Seminole and 
asserting non approval of proposed amendments). 
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 The Cherokee Nation signed a treaty in 1866 and much like the Seminole Treaty of 1866 
it contained equal protection provisions for their Freedmen.142 Subsequent case law has 
reinforced both the Seminole and Cherokee Freedmen’s right to full citizenship including 
political and civil rights, as well as equal treatment in communal property distribution based on 
the Treaty of 1866.143 Plaintiffs in a recent lawsuit against the tribe allege that the Cherokee 
Freedmen had the right to vote as recently as the 1970’s.144 However, the B.I.A. continues to 
 
141 See Letter to Chadwick Smith, Principal Chief Cherokee Nation, (Aug. 6, 2003)(on file with 
Vann v. Norton No. 03-1711 filed Aug. 11, 2003). See also Cherokee Dispute, supra note, 132.  
142 Compare Treaty with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S.-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755 with 
Treaty with Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799. 
143 See  Moses v. Whitmire, Trustee for the Cherokee Freedmen v. Cherokee Nation and United 
States, 30 Ct. Cl. 138 (1895) (holding Freedmen entitled to equal per capita payments of funds as 
well as equal citizens of the Cherokee tribes); See also Daniel Red Bird v. United States, 203 
U.S. 76, (affirming citizenship and proprietary rights of the Freedmen); Seminole Nation v. 
United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455,458-461 (denouncing the Seminole tribes argument that the Treaty 
on extended to political rights and not property interests); Cherokee Freedmen Act, Pub. L. No. 
50-1211, 25 Stat. 608 (1888) (responding to Cherokee Tribal Council legislation which excluded 
Freedmen, Shawnees, Delawares, and intermarried whites form sharing tribal assets,  by  
requiring the Tribe to share its assets). 
144 See Pls.[’] Compl. at ¶ 34, Vann v. Norton, No. 03-1711 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 11, 2003)(noting 
that the 1976 Constitution allowed for Freedmen to vote). See also Linda W. Reese, Cherokee 
Freedwomen in Indian Territory 1863-1890, The Western Historical Quarterly at 
http://www.historycooperative/org/journals/whq/ 
32
contradict its previous position with the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, and disregard the court’s 
holding in the 2002 Seminole case which found the government has a duty to protect the tribe’s 
minority members.  
 On August 11, 2003, the Cherokee Freedmen filed suit against Gale Norton current 
Secretary of the Interior.145 They are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the B.I.A. 
for allowing an amendment to the Cherokee Nation Constitution and recognizing the Tribe’s 
election, despite the Freedmen’s inability to vote.146 On March 18, 2004, the Department of 
Interior answered the complaint with five defenses one of which concerned the possibility of 
dismissal due to the tribe’s status as an indispensable party.147 The government has yet to file a 
motion to dismiss.  On January 14, 2005, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma sought to intervene 
in the case in order to file a motion to dismiss.148 The Cherokee Nation has argued that their 
intervention does not waive their sovereignty and therefore it is not subject to suit.149 
III. Civil Rights Enforcement in Native American Tribes
As demonstrated with the inconsistent actions of the B.I.A the question of whether the 
US government will protect the  Freedmen is arbitrary.  This leaves the Freedmen with really one 
 
33.3/reese.html (noting that the Tribe amended its Constitution to comply with treaty agreement 
by granting voting rights.) (last visited Dec. 17, 2004) CHEROKEE FREEDMEN, supra note 11, at 
63(noting that Cherokees voted in the 19th Century). 
145 See  Pls.[’] Compl. at¶ 1-3, Vann v. Norton, No. 03-1711 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 11, 2003). 
146 See  id. at ¶ 55-59. 
147 See Answer at ¶ 10, Vann v. Norton,  No. 03-1711 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 2004). 
148 See Mot. to Intervene, Vann v. Norton, No. 03-1711 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 14, 2005). 
149 See Id. 
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option, to sue the tribe directly.  Many people have tried unsuccessfully to sue a tribe for civil 
rights violations of their members. Most civil rights legislation does not apply to tribes and often 
times when they do courts have not interpreted the legislation to allow for suit in the federal 
court system.  The United States Constitution does not apply directly to Native American tribes 
the way it applies to the states and federal government.150 “As separate sovereigns pre-existing 
the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those Constitutional 
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”151 Therefore, the 
Constitution applies to the tribes only to the extent it expressly binds them or is made binding on 
them by treaty or Act of Congress.152 
A. Indian Civil Rights Act
In 1968, in order to compensate for the lack of constitutional protection for individual 
tribal members,  Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”).153 The ICRA provides 
tribal members many statutory rights comparable to the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution.154 
150 See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971). 
151 See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56. 
152 See Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 678. 
153 25 U.S.C.§1302 (2004). 
154 No Tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall- (1) make or enforce any 
law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for 
a redress of grievances; (2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
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The ICRA’s purpose is to prohibit tribal governments from violating the civil rights of individual 
tribal members.155 There are, however, some notable exceptions with regard to the Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Fifteenth, and in some respects the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized; (3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; (4) 
compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; (5) take 
any private property for a public use without just compensation; (6) deny to any 
person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; (7) 
require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual 
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any 
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and [or] a 
fine of $ 5,000, or both; (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due 
process of law; (9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or (10) deny to 
any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon 
request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.” Id. 
 
155 See Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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Amendment, all of which do not apply to the tribes.156 The only remedy available for violation of 
the ICRA is a writ of habeas corpus.157 
Despite the ICRA application to tribes, courts have held that the tribes are not subject to 
suit in federal court for violation of a tribal member’s civil rights.158 The pivotal case regarding 
the ICRA and a tribe’s immunity to suit is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.159In Santa Clara, a
female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe sued the Tribe for declaratory and injunctive 
relief under the ICRA’s equal protection provision.160 The plaintiff was a full-blooded member 
of the tribe, however, her daughter was only half.161 The tribe had a policy of allowing sons and 
daughters of male members who married outside of the tribe to become members, while the sons 
and daughters of female members who married outside the tribe could not.162 Because her 
daughter could not become a member of the tribe, she was not able to vote in tribal elections, 
hold secular office, remain on the reservation in the event of her mother’s death, or inherit her 
 
156 See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971). (“Congress intended that the 
provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment…Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, and in some 
respects the equal protection requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be embraced 
in the Indian Bill of Rights.”) 
157 See  25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2004).  
158 See  Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) ;  Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457 
(10th Cir. 1989). 
159 436 U.S. 49.  
160 See  Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 51. 
161 Id. at 52. 
162 Id. at 53. 
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mother’s home or interests in communal land.163 The court concluded that the legislative history 
of the ICRA did not lend itself to provide for a private right of action in federal court.164 
Therefore the ICRA did not waive tribal immunity to suit.165 The court found that the ICRA did 
not implicitly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief because the only form of relief 
provided in the statute was a writ of habeas corpus.166 Also, Congress did not make its intention 
clear to permit the “additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in 
a federal forum would represent.”167 The court concluded that tribal courts were the proper 
forums to vindicate rights under the ICRA.168 
B. Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Legislation
Congress has exclusive and plenary power to enact legislation with respect to Indian 
tribes.169 Many courts have interpreted this congressional power to mean that statutes of general 
jurisdiction apply to Native American tribes.170 This interpretation is called the Tuscarora rule.171 
163 Id. at 52. 
164 Id. at 61. 
165 Id. at 72.  
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 65. But see Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (noting the futility of 
bringing discrimination suit against the tribe in its own court). 
169 See id. 
170 See Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (“It is 
now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all 
persons includes Indians and their property interests.”). 
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The application of this rule to the Freedmen’s claim will be discussed later.172 Relevant to the 
analysis of the Freedmen’s case are several cases involving federal civil rights legislation where 
courts have restricted the application of the laws because of tribal sovereignty. 173 The laws 
include: 42 U.S.C. §1981 (2005)(“ §1981”);174 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2005)175; 42 U.S.C §1983 
 
171 See id. Over the years courts have come up with three exceptions to the Tuscarora rule: (1), 
whether the law touches exclusive rights of self governance; see  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 55-56; (2)whether the law would abrogate rights guaranteed by treaties, See  Smart 
v. State Farm Ins. Co.  868 F. 2d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 1989); (3) whether there is proof either 
legislative history or some other means that Congress did not intend the law to apply to Indians 
on their reservations, See U.S. v. Farris, 624 F. 2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980). 
172 See Part V. D.1 infra.
173 See  Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 
538 U.S. 701, 709 (2003)(finding that 42 U.S.C §1983 does not apply to tribes); Delauney v. 
Collins, 97 Fed. Appx. 229 (10th Cir. 2004) (allowing §1981 §1982 suit against individual tribal 
members) Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F. 2d 1457, 1463(10th Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that 42 U.S.C 1981 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act do not abrogate Indian 
sovereignty); Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980); Stroud v. Seminole 
Tribe of Florida, 606 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D.Mont. 1969). 
174 All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
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(2005)(“§1983”),176 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Amendment (also known as 42 U.S.C. 
§2000d),177 Other civil rights legislation restricted by courts178 include: the Americans with 
 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other. 
175 All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, 
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property. 
176 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
177 Prohibition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and 
discrimination under federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or national origin. 
178 See Florida Parapalegic Ass’n Inc., v. Miccosukkee Tribe 166 F.3d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir. 
1999)(finding the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to the tribes but does not waive the 
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Disabilities Act (“ADA”),179 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act(“ADEA”),180 and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.181 
In Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, the courts reaffirmed tribal sovereignty as a 
defense against civil rights suits.182 Mr. Nero, a Freedman, brought suit against the Cherokee 
Nation for denial of his right to vote in tribal elections and participate in federal benefits 
programs. 183 Mr. Nero argued that he stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C §1981, §2000d 
and the Treaty of 1866.184 The court dismissed the claim under the treaty finding that the treaty 
 
Tribe’s immunity from suit); Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 
2001)(finding the Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity from suit by accepting federal 
funds in order to  comply with the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701); EEOC v. Fond du Lac 
Heavy Equip., 986 F.2d 246, 251 (8th Cir. 1993)(holding that ADEA does not apply to tribes) 
179 42 U.S.C. §12182(a)(2004). (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” ) 
180 29 U.S.C §621(b)(2004).  (“It is therefore the purpose of this Act… to promote employment 
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment.”) 
181 29 U.S.C. §701 (2004)(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of disability) .  
182 See  Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F. 2d 1457, 1459 (10th Cir. 1989). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1458. 
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did not convey a right to suit but merely a substantive constraint on the tribe. 185 The court 
analyzed the 42 U.S.C §1981 and §2000d using the Tuscarora rule.186 When applying the 
exceptions to the Tuscarora rule, the court found that application of §1981 and §2000d would 
“affect the tribe’s right to self-governance in a purely internal matter.”187 The court went on to 
note that allowing a plaintiff to allege race discrimination with regards to the way a tribe decided 
membership would “in effect eviscerate the tribe’s sovereign power to define itself, and would 
thus constitute an unacceptable interference with a tribe’s ability to maintain itself as a culturally 
and politically distinct entity.”188 
In Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, the Tenth Circuit dismissed  a non-Indians suit against the 
tribe for race discrimination in employment practices under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1983. 189 In 
citing Wardle, Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, a case involving a non-Indian dismissed from 
her job as teacher, the court explained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the 
plaintiffs claim under §1981.190 The court reasoned that Congress did not expressly or impliedly 
extend §1981 to the employment practices of Indian tribes particularly those that involve 
preferential treatment for Indians over non Indians.191 
185 Id. at 1461.
186 Id.  at 1462. 
187 Id. at 1463. 
188 Id. 
189 See  623 F2d. 670 (10th Cir. 1980) 
190 See  606 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (S.D.Fla. 1985).  
191 Id. 
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 A court further upheld tribal sovereignty against a discrimination suit from tribal 
members against their tribe in Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Black Feet Indian 
Reservation.192 The plaintiffs included nine members of the tribe seeking punitive damages and 
an injunction from the tribe for use of its jail under 42 U.S.C. §1981.193 The court found that the 
law in its original form as the Civil Rights Act of 1870 was a “post civil war measure concerned 
with the rights of the recently liberated Negroes” that excluded the Indians.194 Thus the only law 
“governing the daily affairs of many of the western Indians was the tribal law.” 195 Therefore 
§1981 can not govern inter-tribal relationships.196 Also because an “Indian is subject to tribal law 
and the white person is not, Indians and whites are not treated equally as required by §1981 and 
cannot be unless tribal powers are extinguished.197 
However in Delauney v. Collins, the Tenth Circuit upheld a ruling in favor of a §1981 
and §1982 suit brought by a non Indian and his wife, a tribal member, against individual tribal 
members.198 The plaintiffs claimed that individual tribal members resentful of their interracial 
marriage (the husband was Caucasian)  intentionally blocked their water supply because of the 
 
192 See 301 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D.Mont. 1969) 
193 Id. at 87. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 88. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 See 97 Fed. Appx. 229 (10th Cir. 2004) 
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 husband’s race.199 This case differs significantly from the prior case just discussed because it 
involved individual members and not the tribe as an entity. Finally, in Inyo County, California v. 
Paiute-Shoshone Indians, although  the issue was not before the Supreme Court  Justice 
Ginsburg noted the court she believed that tribes could not be subjected to suit under §1983.200 
Attempts to enforce civil rights within a tribe have been met with great opposition by the 
courts.  As mentioned earlier attempts to sue the U.S. government to protect tribal minority 
members is very arbitrary.  Courts are particularly reluctant to enforce general laws with regards 
to “internal matters” such as membership.  This is naturally a concern for tribes and courts alike 
that people might be able to sue their way in tribal membership and thus benefits.   In order to 
file suit against the tribes, the Freedmen must show Congress intended to abrogate tribal 
sovereignty with regards to their membership and their particular civil rights. The following 
sections will analyze the Thirteenth Amendment and its enforcement legislation as possible 
examples of Congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty. 
IV.  Recommendation: The  Freedmen Should use the Thirteenth Amendment To Abrogate 
Tribal  Sovereignty Because The Current Disenfranchisement Constitutes A “Badge And 
Incident Of Slavery.” 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s applicability to Sovereign Entities
A. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Ban On Involuntary Servitude Reaches Native 
American Tribes.
199 See id at 231. 
200 See  Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 
538 U.S. 701, 709. 
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 Unlike any other Constitutional provision, the Thirteenth Amendment is understood to 
apply to both private and public entities.201 The Thirteenth Amendment consists of two parts; 
first a ban on slavery, and second, a clause that allows for Congressional enforcement of the ban 
on slavery.202 Courts have interpreted the first part to be self-actuating.203 
201 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 
71, n.10 (1989) (finding that the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement legislation applies to state 
official’s so long as for prospective injunctive relief.); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36, 69 (1872) (describing the Thirteenth Amendment as a “grand yet simple declaration of the 
personal freedom of all human races within the jurisdiction of this government.”).  See also 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-13, at 333 (2d ed. 1988); LAUREN 
KARES, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of a Doctrine, 80
CORNELL L. REV., 372, 375 (1995) (“Read literally, the Thirteenth Amendment touches any 
private action that results in personal slavery or involuntary servitude.”); See also Jones v. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409 at 422-36 (1968) (finding that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches private as 
well as public forms of discrimination.) 
202 See  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.  Congress shall have the power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.” 
203 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1893). 
 This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without 
any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of 
circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and 
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 The Thirteenth Amendment can be a tool to enforce civil rights.204 However, because of 
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment205 and the voting protections of the 
 
established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to 
meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe 
proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation 
may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere 
prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute 
declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the 
United States. Id. 
See also Alma Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1238 (2nd Cir. 1979)(finding that Thirteenth 
Amendment ban on “badges and incidents of slavery” must be realized through enforcement 
legislation.). 
204 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 431-32 (explaining the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. 
39-31, 14 Stat. 27). Senator Trumbill’s bill as he pointed out would ‘destroy all the 
discriminations’ embodied in the Black Codes” Id. See , e.g., KARES, supra note 202, at 377 
(“Congress enforces the Thirteenth Amendment when it prohibits conduct or laws that subject 
individuals to the same type of degradation that slavery imposed. These conditions are called 
“the badges of slavery” or sometime the “badges of servitude.”). The Black Codes passed by 
southern states after the Thirteenth were what Congress considered as “badges of servitude”. Id..
These Codes prevented blacks form owning property or suing in courts. Id. at 412, n.19 
(explaining the phrase “badges of slavery/servitude, came into being during Congressional 
debates on the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment). 
45
Fifteenth Amendment,206 it is rarely used. Also, courts sought to limit this particular use of the 
Thirteenth Amendment soon after its ratification.207 
205 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
206See U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1. “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”  
207 See KARES, supra note 201, at 377-78(citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1893)). 
 The Civil Rights Cases struck down federal legislation purporting to create a 
claim for money damages on behalf of anyone denied equal access to 
‘accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public 
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement.’ 
The Supreme Court stated that actionable conduct under the Amendment included 
only ‘the inseparable incidents of the institution’ of slavery such as “compulsory 
service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his 
movements…[and] disability to hold property.” Id. 
 “[C]ourts have reduced the self executing power of the Amendment’s first section through 
limiting constructions.” see id. at 375.  See also Geri J. Yonover, 58 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 873
(1982) “[T]he Supreme Court decisions in the Civil Rights Cases,…progressively contracted the 
reach of congressional power under the amendment.”). 
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 The Amendment’s unique nature allows it to apply to tribes where other parts of the 
Constitution do not.208 Courts have found the Amendment can reach Native Americans on 
reservations to ban involuntary servitude.209 In In re Sah Quah, an Alaskan Native sought to 
gain his emancipation from his master under the Thirteenth Amendment.210 The slave’s master, 
also an Alaskan Native, claimed sovereign immunity as a defense.211 He argued that his 
community’s rules and customs, which included the selling and holding of slaves, were 
independent of any other law, authority, or jurisdiction.212 Therefore, the civil authorities had no 
jurisdiction over his tribe.213 The court concluded that the tribe was subject to the Thirteenth 
Amendment and as such, the plaintiff should be granted his freedom.214 The court noted the 
 
208 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment does not 
apply to Indian tribes.) 
209 See  31 F. 327, 331(D. Ala. 1886)(finding that the Thirteenth Amendment applied to Alaskan 
Native tribes); see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455, 460 (referring to the 
Emancipation Proclamation “The treaty did not make the Indian slave freedmen. That was 
accomplished three years before the treaty was signed.”); Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 
1164, 1168 (W.D. Okla. 2002) (“Following the Civil War the Black Seminoles were 
emancipated by the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution”) 
210 In re Sah Quah, 31 F. at 327. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 327-328. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 331. 
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unique nature of the Amendment as “brief but broad in scope” with “language [that] is sweeping 
and far reaching.”215 
Other cases that pertain directly to the Freedmen have acknowledged the applicability of 
the Thirteenth Amendment to Native American tribes.216 Although the Thirteenth Amendment 
applies to Native American tribes, the question still remains as to whether the current 
disenfranchisement of the Freedmen descendants falls within the scope of its protection. 
 B. “The Badges And Incidents Of Slavery”
The Thirteen Amendment’s protection extends beyond involuntary servitude to 
discrimination.217 Congress demonstrated its intent to ban the likenesses of slavery commonly 
referred to as the “badges and incidents of slavery” through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
was the first enforcement legislation of the Thirteenth Amendment.218 Traditionally, courts have 
 
215 Id. at 330. 
216 See  United States v. Choctaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115 at 123 (1904) (“It is urged that the 
Negroes became free by the… Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
and acquired thereby all the rights of freemen. That may be granted…”); see generally, Allen v. 
Trimmer, 144 P. 795, at 797 (1914); Seminole Nation v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 151, 152 
(1940) (explaining that United States desire to abolish slavery within the tribes). 
217 See KARES supra note 201, at 412, n.19 (quoting Senator Trumbell, “any statute…which 
deprives any citizen of civil rights …is in fact a badge of servitude which by the Constitution is 
prohibited”) Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).  
218 Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1982 (1976)). 
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defined the “badges and incidents of slavery.”219 However, since the 1960’s, courts have allowed 
Congress to define them.220 
In Jones v. Mayer, the plaintiffs alleged that a private company’s refusal to sell them a 
home because of their race constituted a §1982221 violation.222 The defendants countered that the 
statute did not apply because there was no state action.223 The court held that §1982 applied to 
both private and public acts224 and that §1982 was an extension of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
 
219 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1893). 
220 See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (allowing deference to Congress in determining 
the incidents of slavery); Id. (“Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
to determine what are the ‘badges and the incidents of slavery’ and the authority to translate that 
determination into effective legislation.”); Id. at 443-44(concluding that the ends and means of 
42 U.S.C §1982 are legitimate exercises of Congressional power). Id. (agreeing with 
Representative Wilson of Iowa reasoning for urging the Congress to adopt the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, Pub. L. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)) (“The end is legitimate…because it is defined by the 
Constitution itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom… A man who enjoys the civil rights 
mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery….This settles the appropriateness of this 
measure, and that settles its Constitutionality.”). 
221 See supra note 175. 
222 Id. at 412. See also  District of Columbia v. Carter 409 U.S. 418 (1973) 
223 Jones, 392 U.S.  at 412. .
224 Id. at 413. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (finding “narrow 
construction of … §1982 … would be quit inconsistent with broad and sweeping nature of 
protection meant to be afforded by …Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which §1982 was derived”).  
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which was intended to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.225 The court found that the 
Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to determine the “badges and incidents of slavery” 
and “translate that determination into effective legislation.”226 Therefore, the denial of property 
based on race was one of the “badges and incidents of slavery.”227 
However, cognizant of the potential for abuse, courts have limited the scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on the “badges and incidents of slavery.”228 First, the courts have 
 
225 Jones, 392 U.S. at 422.    Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237. 
226 Jones, 392 U.S.  at 441. See also id. (holding that the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment “clothed ‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing 
all ‘badges and incidents of slavery’ in the United States’”).  
227 See id. at 440. 
228 See  Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,  226-27 (1970) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on the “badges and incidents of slavery” allows for suit 
concerning racial segregation in public schools without enforcement legislation). 
To reach that result from the Thirteenth Amendment would severely stretch its 
short simple words and do violence to its history. Establishing this Court's  
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new laws to govern the 
thousands of towns and cities of the country would grant it a lawmaking power far 
beyond the imagination of the amendment's authors. Id. 
 
See  also e.g., Alma Society v. Mellon, 601 F. 2d 1225, 1238 (2nd Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979)(rejecting petitioner’s claim that New York’s adoption law requiring adoption 
records remain sealed constituted a “badge or incident” of slavery). 
50
found that the Thirteenth Amendment on its face does not bar or create causes of action against 
the “badges and incidents of slavery.”229 Second, courts have found that any claim based solely 
on the Thirteenth Amendment could only ban conditions of servitude.230 Courts have also 
upheld a sovereign entity’s immunity to the ancillary enforcement legislation (i.e. 42 U.S.C. 
 
229 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27; see also Alma Society v. Mellon, 601 F. 2d 
at 1237. (“The court has never held that the Amendment itself unaided by legislation…reaches 
the ‘badges and incidents’ of slavery as well as the actual conditions of slavery and involuntary 
servitude.”). See also KARES, supra note 201, at 380 (noting that federal legislation may create a 
cause of action against conduct Congress perceives to be a badges of slavery); Id. at 412, n.37 
(showing 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1982 as examples of federal legislation which create a cause of 
action against badges and incidents of slavery). See id. (including 42 U.S.C § 1983) within the 
realm of legislation that a person may sue to assert a right to be free from involuntary servitude. 
230 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting)(arguing that the 
Thirteenth Amendment was “inadequate to the protection of the rights of those who had been in 
slavery”). Justice Harlan noted that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to pick up where the 
Thirteenth Amendment left off.  Id.  However, this leaves the Freedmen with no recourse 
because the Fourteenth Amendment is a protection against State action. See U.S. CONST. amend 
XIV.  See Alma, 601 F. 2d at 1237. (“The Court had directly invoked the Amendment only to 
strike down state laws imposing the condition of peonage.”); see also  Harrigan v. Sebastian’s 
on Waterfront, Inc. 629 F. Supp. 102, 103, n.1 (D. V.I. 1985) (“The Court observes that claims 
based upon the Thirteenth Amendment… as opposed to statutes enacted under its enabling 
clause must allege some form of compulsory, enforced labor without option.”). 
51
§1981, §1982 and §1983).231 For example, States can use sovereign immunity based in the 
Eleventh Amendment to protect them from suit for damages.232 However, courts have allowed 
suits against a State’s official for prospective injunctions.233 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment applies to Native American tribes, two issues 
remain: (1) whether the current disenfranchisement constitutes a “badge or incident of slavery;” 
and (2) whether the ancillary legislation used to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on the 
“badges and incidents of slavery” abrogates tribal sovereign immunity.  
C. The Current Disenfranchisement Constitutes A “Badge And Incident Of 
Slavery.”
231 See, e.g., See  Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the 
Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 709 (2003)(finding that 42 U.S.C §1983 does not apply to tribes); 
Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F. 2d 1457, 1463(10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that 
42 U.S.C 1981 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act do not abrogate Indian sovereignty); 
Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980); Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 
606 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian 
Reservation, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D.Mont. 1969). 
.
232 See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991)(finding that Indian 
tribes could not sue State of Alaska because of 11th Amendment protection). 
233 See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, n.10 (1988); Delauney v. Collins 
97 Fed. Appx. 229 (10th Cir. 2004) (allowing §1981 §1982 suit against individual tribal 
members) 
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 The denial of membership and the incident disenfranchisement of the Freedmen 
constitutes a “badge and incident” of slavery for several reasons.  First, the actions deny the 
Freedmen property, based on race.234 As noted before, members within the Seminole and 
Cherokee tribe with white blood were given full “Blood Status” and consequently their 
descendants have not been denied access to any property, including the Judgment Fund in the 
Seminole case, and federally funded programs in the Cherokee case.235 The Seminole Freedmen 
and the Cherokee Freedmen have also been denied the right to vote.236 Second, particularly with 
the Seminole case, the denial of Freedmen membership is based on a prior condition of 
slavery.237 The tribe claims that they are denying property because the Black Seminoles were not 
citizens of the tribe in 1823.238 However, if they were not members of the tribe or of the United 
 
234 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (banning denial of the 
rights to property as enjoyed by white persons); see also Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441 
(1968) (noting that “the badges and incidents of slavery-its ‘burdens and disabilities’-included 
restraints upon ‘those fundamental rights which are the essences of civil freedom…namely the 
right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property.”). 
235 See Part II.A supra. see also Part II.B supra.
236 See Part II.A supra.
237 See 14 Stat. 27 (granting the right to equally share in property interests as white citizens 
irrespective of prior condition of slavery or servitude); see also Part II. A (explaining that the 
Seminole Tribe denied the Freedmen descendant’s right to the Judgment Fund because they were 
slaves in 1823 and couldn’t partake in property ownership).  
238 See Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 (W.D. Okla. 2002).  
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States,239 then the Freedmen were property.240 Therefore, the tribe is actually using the 
Freedmen’s prior condition of slavery and not their lack of tribal citizenship to deny them a share 
in the Judgment Fund. Clearly such a use of a person’s ancestor’s condition of servitude  to deny 
a person property is the very sort of “badge or incident of slavery” Congress sought to eliminate 
by passing the Thirteenth Amendment and its enforcement legislation.241 Third, the current 
disenfranchisement is denying the Freedmen the right to vote in tribal elections.242 This denies 
the Freedmen from equal protection under tribal law.243 
Although a court may concede that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to Native 
American tribes, and the current disenfranchisement constitutes a “badge or incident of slavery,” 
the court may be reluctant to abrogate tribal sovereignty.  As noted above, case law has already 
found in many instances that the ancillary legislation needed to enforce the ban on the “badges 
 
239 See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856). 
240 See  LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that the Seminoles traded livestock for their 
African slaves); See also Natsu Taylor Saito, Articles & Essays: From Slavery and Seminoles to 
Aids in South Africa: An Essay on Race and Property in International Law, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 
1135, 1171-72 (explaining that the refusal to allow the Seminole Freedmen to partake in the 
Judgment fund is based on the premise that before the Seminole Treaty of 1866 the Freedmen 
were property.) The Seminole Nation as “it existed in 1823” excluded Freedmen although they 
were one of the U.S. government’s primary reasons to taking the land in the first place. Id. 
241 See  Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 at 441; Kares supra note 201 at 412 n. 9. 
242 See Cherokee Dispute supra note 132; See  also 223 F. Supp. 2d 122 (2002). 
243 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. 
54
and incidences of slavery” does not apply to sovereign entities.244 Also, courts traditionally have 
been reluctant to abrogate tribal sovereignty particularly with regards to membership. 245 
D.  Can The Ancillary Enforcement Legislation Abrogate Tribal Sovereignty?
With regards to the Freedmen, courts should find the ancillary legislation abrogates tribal 
sovereignty for three reasons:  (1) Congress has already abrogated tribal sovereignty with regards 
to the Freedmen’s civil rights and membership; (2) courts can create a narrow exception to allow 
the Freedmen’s claim, but not open the tribe up to more litigation because the Freedmen’s case is 
distinguishable from prior case law; and (3) if courts acknowledge the Thirteenth Amendment 
reaches tribes then so should Congressional enforcement action including legislation and treaties. 
1. Congress Intended To Abrogate The Tribes’ Sovereignty With Regards To 
The Freedmen’s Membership.
Courts may still refuse to find an abrogation of the Seminole or Cherokee tribe’s 
sovereignty because of the enforcement statutes’ silence concerning their application to Native 
American tribes. In Nero, the Tenth Circuit Court found that because membership was an 
internal matter for tribes, the court would not apply the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement 
legislation.246 But that court’s analysis was incomplete. It did not consider legislation being 
 
244 See Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 
538 U.S. 701 (2003); Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F. 2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989). 
245 See Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F. 2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying the Tuscarora 
rule and concluding that 42 U.S.C. §1981 and §2000d cannot apply to Indian tribes because they 
would “affect the Tribe’s right to self-governance in a purely internal matter”.). 
246 See  Nero v.  Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F. 2d 1457, 1463. 
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passed at the time the tribes signed the 1866 treaties,247 nor did it consider Congressional plenary 
power with regards to tribal membership.248 According to the Tuscarora rule, general laws apply 
to Native American tribes.249 Analysis of the Freedmen’s case using the exceptions to the 
Tuscarora rule,250 (as the court did in Nero) demonstrates a  congressional  intent for the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement legislation to abrogate tribal sovereignty with regards to 
the Freedmen’s membership and equal protection.  
 The Tuscarora rule is an understanding that general statutes apply to Native American 
tribes.251 However, to conserve tribal sovereignty courts have applied three exceptions, any of 
which will satisfy to defeat the application of the statute to a tribe.252 The exceptions to the 
 
247 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986)(finding that a clear intent to abrogate 
tribal sovereignty can be found from “clear and reliable” evidence in the legislative history of the 
statute); see also EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip., 986 F. 2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 
1993)(concluding that “some affirmative evidence of congressional intent either in the language 
of the statute or its legislative history is required to find a ‘clear and plain’ intent to apply the 
statute to Indian tribes”). 
248 See  Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F. 2d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 1971) (“[I]t is well settled that 
Congress has plenary control over Indian tribal relations and property, …it was…held that such 
… power … included the power to regulate and determine tribal membership… [and] define and 
describe those persons who should be treated and regarded as members of and Indian Tribe.”). 
249 See  Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
250 See id. at 116 (1960). 
251 Id. 
252 See Nero, 892 F. 2d at 1462. 
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Tuscarora rule weighs: a) if the application of the law would abrogate rights found in a treaty; b) 
proof of legislative history that Congress intended that the law not apply to the Native Americans 
on reservations; and c) the law touches the exclusive right of self-government in purely internal 
matters.253 
First, concerning the treaty rights, the Freedmen can show that application of the 
enforcement legislation actually helps to assure their rights and the tribe’s promise under the 
Seminole and Cherokee treaties of 1866.254 The Tenth Circuit in analyzing the treaty protection 
language found that Cherokee Treaty language did not constitute an “unequivocal expression” of 
waiver by the Cherokee Nation of its sovereign immunity.255 Such language merely placed 
“substantive constraints” on the tribe.256 The Tenth Circuits brief analysis of the Cherokee 
Treaty of 1866 not only ignored the rights conveyed to the Freedmen but also ignored legislative 
proof  (the second prong of the Tuscarora rule) of Congress intentions to protect the Freedmen 
with the treaty and abrogate the tribe’s sovereignty by allowing suit in federal court.  Article VII 
of the Treaty257 grants original federal jurisdiction over all causes concerning the Treaty of 1866, 
the Tenth Circuit ignored this analysis.  The general provision to ban involuntary servitude and a 
 
253 Id. 
254 Compare Treaty with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755 and
Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799. with 42 U.S.C. 
§1981 (providing for equal treatment with regards to contracts) and § 1982(providing for equal 
treatment with regards to property rights and §1983 (assuring equal treatment under the law). 
255 See Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F. 2d 1457, 1461. 
256 Id.  
257 See Treat with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat. art. 7, 14 Stat. 799.  
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provision that assures equal protection for the Freedmen258 along with the Article VII provision 
on federal court jurisdiction demonstrates more than a “substantive constraint” on the tribe. 
 In order for a statute to apply to abrogate tribal sovereignty there must be some 
affirmative evidence of congressional intent in the language of the statute, the legislative history, 
or the “surrounding circumstances,” to apply a statute to Native American tribes.259 In Jones v. 
Mayer, the Court found that 42 U.S.C §1982 was the modern manifestation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866.260 The Civil Rights Act of 1866261 was passed within one month of the Seminole 
 
258 See  Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty 
with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat.755.  
259 See  supra note 247.  
260 See  Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968); See also KARES, supra note 202, at 412,n.37 
(noting that 42 U.S.C. §1981, §1982, and §1983 are example of legislation of banning the 
“badges and incidents of slavery”.) 
261 In its original text the Act did not apply to Native American tribes.  See  CAROL TEBBEN,
Symposium: Native Americans And The Constitution: An American Trifederalism Based Upon 
The Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 318 (explaining that when the 
Act was written the United States was still making treaties with tribes as sovereign independent 
nations). See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Pub. L. No. 41-120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871) (officially ending 
Congress making of new treaties with tribes). Native Americans were not citizens of the United 
States at that time. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 103 (1884). It was not until 1924, fifty-six 
years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, that all 
Native Americans were granted citizenship by birth in the United States. See Citizenship to 
Indians Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified in the Nationality Act, 8 
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Treaty of 1866 and two months of the Cherokee Treaty of 1866.262 One could argue that  the 
treaty is an example of enforcement legislation meant to apply to Native Americans on 
reservations because the Civil Rights Act of 1866 excluded Native American’s on 
reservations.263 Although this may seem like Congress did not intend for the Act to apply to 
tribes, it actually makes the argument stronger that Congress tried to incorporate the Act in the 
Treaties by both making slavery illegal within the tribes and  granting the Freedmen equal rights 
and membership for generations.264Also at the time of its passage Congress primary exercise of 
authority over Indian tribes was through treaties.265 It was not until 1871 that Congress ceased 
using treaties with Indian tribes.266 The treaties as enforcement legislation or an incorporation of 
 
U.S.C.S. § 1401(b) (2004) (“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at 
birth: a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other 
aboriginal Tribe….”). 
262 See Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty 
with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755; Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
263 See TEBBEN, supra note 261. 
264 Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 with  Treaty with 
Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755 and Treaty with the Cherokee, 
July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799. 
265 See TEBBEN, supra note 261. 
266 See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Pub. L. No. 41-120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871). 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1866, were part Congressional scheme to rid the country of involuntary 
servitude and the “badges and incidents of slavery.”267 
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to assure equal treatment for the newly 
freed men and women in the United States.268 Congress has passed subsequent legislation on 
 
267 See Jackson v. United States and Comanche Indians, 34 Ct. Cl. 441, 445 (1899) (“At the time 
of this amendment [Thirteenth] to the Constitution commissioners were negotiating a treaty with 
…Indians…in the furtherance of the national policy of abolishing slavery.”); see  KARES, supra 
note 202, at 412, n.20 (noting that Congress was countering the discrimination the freed men and 
women were facing when it passed the enforcement legislation). 
268 See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (finding that the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement legislation was to eliminate all forms racial discrimination with regards to property 
acquisition). Some courts have found that the Freedmen were not citizens of the United States 
until the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868. See  Jackson, 34 Ct. Cl. at 445, 446 
(finding that a Freedmen was not citizen of the United States in 1867 because the Fourteenth 
Amendment was still under consideration at the time of signing of the treaty with the Choctaw 
and Chickasaw Nation in 1866).   This would then prevent the Freedmen from benefiting from 
the protection of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which applies to U.S. citizens See  Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). However, that argument would void the Civil 
Rights Act 1866 in its entirety, because no African Americans were citizens of the United States 
until 1868. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856). This understanding is 
inconsistent with Congressional intent for the Act.  The legislative history of the Act shows that 
Congress intended to get rid of the “badges and incidents” of slavery in the United States 
irrespective of the actors. See  Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
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behalf of the Freedmen to assure their equal protection when the tribes tried to take it away.269 
These factors firmly indicate that Congress intended the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement 
legislation to apply to Native American tribes with regard to the Freedmen and their 
descendant’s equal treatment within the tribes. 
 Finally, in Nero, the Tenth Circuit found that application of the civil rights legislation 
would touch one of the exclusive rights of self-governance: deciding membership.270 However, 
the Supreme Court has found that “included in Congress’ plenary power over the tribes is the 
power to regulate and determine tribal membership, and in so doing to define and describe those 
persons who should be treated and regarded as members of an Indian Tribe.”271 Arguably, this is 
the power Congress exercised in 1866 when it officially made the Freedmen members of the 
tribes through the Seminole Treaty of 1866 and the Cherokee Treaty of 1866.272 Indeed, the 
Dawes Rolls, which have defined tribal membership for generations, were a product of a 
Commission set up by Congress.273 This Commission, charged with determining membership of 
the tribes had permission to exclude and include potential tribal members.274 
269 See  Cherokee Freedmen, Pub. L. No. 50-1211, 25 Stat. 608 (1888)(overruling Cherokee 
Nation’s action to exclude the Freedmen and other adopted members from property interests). 
270 See  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978). 
271 See  Groudhog v. Keeler, 442 F. 2d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Stephens v. Cherokee 
Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899)). 
272 See Stephens, 174 U.S. at 488.  
273 See id. (finding that Congress’ creation of the Dawes Commission was an legitimate exercise 
of its power to define membership). 
274 See id. 
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 Therefore, a complete analysis of the Tuscarora rule shows that the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ancillary legislation does apply to tribes when enforcing equal treatment of the 
Freedmen. The rights in a treaty would be enforced.  Analysis of the legislative intent shows 
Congress intended to apply the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to tribes as part of their national scheme 
to be rid of slavery and its vestiges. Finally, the Freedmen’s membership and treatment within 
the tribe is not purely internal matter. Congress made the Freedmen members through a 
legitimate exercise of its oversight over membership within the tribe. Thus, Congress already 
limited tribal sovereignty with regards to the Freedmen. 
 2. The Freedmen’s Situation Is Distinguishable from Prior Case Law and
application of the Thirteenth Amendment’s Civil Rights Enforcement 
Legislation Will Irreparably Harm Tribal Sovereignty.
The Freedmen’s case is sui generis.275 Their history as well as their racial background 
has distinguished them from case law (excluding Nero analyzed above) that has denied federal 
jurisdiction to other plaintiffs.276 Unlike prior litigants discussed above the Freedmen have their 
civil rights and in the Cherokee case a right to sue in federal court, confirmed in treaties signed 
with the U.S. government. The language of the treaties indicates that the Thirteenth Amendment 
was meant to apply to the tribes as both a ban on involuntary servitude and the “badges and 
incidents of slavery.”277 The Freedmen are descendants of a class of newly freed men and 
 
275 See generally Treaty with Cherokee, July 19, 1866,  U.S.-Cherokee Nat., 14 Stat. 799; see 
also Treaty with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S.-Seminole Nat., 14 State. 755.  
276 See Part I supra.
277 See Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799 ; Treaty 
with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755. In both cases the Treaties 
explained that the tribes would no longer have slavery and would treat the Freedmen as equal 
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women who Congress intended to protect. Their descendants were freed with the Thirteenth 
Amendment and protected by its enforcement legislation.  The fact that they are members of 
tribes did not lessen Congress intent to protect them.278 The Freedmen, with regards to their  
tribes attempts to deny them property and voting rights  have a raised level of protection that 
other litigants including full blooded tribal members do not.  
 The treaties that both tribes signed made clear that they were to free their slaves and treat 
them as equals.279 Congress was trying to assure that the “badges and incidents” of slavery would 
be terminated, because the equality was to exist for in perpetuity.280 Therefore, a court should 
 
members. See also Seminole Nation v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 151, 153 (1940)(asserting that 
the Tribe knew “that the rights they were granting to their former slaves by this treaty were equal 
rights in all tribal property as well as civil and other rights.”). See, e.g., 25 Stat. 608 (1888) 
(legislating that the Freedmen were equal members of the Cherokee Tribe and would equally 
partake in monies owed to the Tribe for any sell of land.)  
278 See Cherokee Freedmen Act, Pub. L. No. 50-1211, 25 Stat. 608 (1888) (responding to 
Cherokee Tribal Council legislation which excluded Freedmen, Shawnees, Delawares, and 
intermarried whites form sharing tribal assets,  by  requiring the Tribe to share its assets). 
279 See Treaty with the Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty 
with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755. Note that the language is 
virtually identical in the treaties and one could assume that the same reasoning when applied to 
Seminole Nation also applies to the Cherokee Nation.  See  Seminole Nation, 90 Ct. Cl. at 153. 
280 See Treaty with Cherokee, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nat., art. 9, 14 Stat. 799; Treaty 
with Seminole, Mar. 21, 1866, U.S.-Seminole Nat., art. 2, 14 Stat. 755.  (requiring equal rights 
and treatment to the Freedmen and their descendants). 
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allow the Freedmen’s suit because they are a special class of litigants Congress intended to free 
and protect for generations through signed treaties with the tribes.281 This distinguishes the 
Freedmen from plaintiffs in cases where a court denied application the Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation.282 Unlike the Freedmen, they do not have equal protection reinforced in 
treaties which were agreed upon by the tribes. 
 Allowing suit in the Seminole case (Cherokee tribe already has a provision allowing suit 
in their Treaty)  will not create irreparable harm to tribal sovereignty in the rest of Indian 
Country. Nor will it open the Seminole or Cherokee tribe to more suits by non Freedmen.  In 
allowing the Freemen’s suit the courts will be opening a very narrow window.  Tribal 
sovereignty will remain against all other Constitutional Amendments.283 The Thirteenth 
 
281 See  Seminole Nation, 90 Ct. Cl. at 152 (showing that the Commissioners who represented the 
United States “declared among other things that the United States desired slavery to be abolished 
and measures to be taken to incorporate the slaves into the tribes, with their rights guaranteed.”). 
282 See generally  Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the 
Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) but see generally Nero v.  Cherokee Nation, 892 F. 2d 
1457, 1459 (10th Cir. 1989) (denying Freedmen’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and §2000d). The 
Court denied the suit based on the Tusarora rule and did not analyze whether the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s reach to the tribes as well as the plaintiff, a Freedmen’s unique situation allowed 
suit under § 1981 and § 2000d. Id. See also Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 
1980); Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 606 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Spotted Eagle v. 
Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D.Mont. 1969). 
283 Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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Amendment will only apply directly where there is involuntary servitude.284 When there are 
cases of the “badges and incidents of slavery” the litigant must show that Congress intended the 
enforcement legislation to protect them as a class.285 There are few litigants that can meet such 
requirements in the super majority of Indian tribes in the United States.  
 With regards to the Seminole and Cherokee tribes few litigants will be able to meet such 
requirements to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement legislation.  Many people are 
descended from slaves but a very small percentage was granted protection or membership in 
treaties.286 Therefore the Freedmen are the only litigants that could use such an avenue to 
abrogate tribal sovereignty.   Courts can also limit the Freedmen descendants redress from the 
tribe by allowing only prospective injunctive relief from tribal officials or individual members 
preventing membership rights. 287 Such a relief would greatly benefit the Freedmen.  Upon 
 
284 See supra note 229. 
285 See generally United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986). 
286 Arguably most African Americans are descended from slavery but opening the tribes up to 
suit from the Freedmen descendants will not open the tribe to suit from any African American 
with a percentage of  Native American blood because the requirement that Congress needs to 
extend protection to them.  
287 See Delauney v. Collins 97 Fed. Appx. 229 (10th Cir. 2004) (allowing §1981 §1982 suit 
against individual tribal members);Will v. Michigan Dep’t of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71,n.10 (1989) 
(allowing suit against state officials).  Arguably this avenue is moot because both tribes have 
amended their constitutions to exclude Freedmen. Therefore moving the redress beyond 
individual members but to the tribe itself.  
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gaining their membership back many rights could be restored including the right to vote which 
could be used to regain property rights. 
Conclusion
Freedmen have been a part of Native American tribes for generations before the treaties 
of 1866.288 The treaties made their membership official289 and the language shows they were to 
remain an equal part of the tribes for generations.290 Despite this promise made to the United 
States and to the Freedmen, the Cherokee and Seminole tribes have systematically tried to deny 
the Freedmen equal treatment.291 For many Freedmen, this is a fight over money.292 For many 
full-blooded Native Americans, this is a fight over self-identification and preserving sovereignty 
over issues of membership.293 This comment was not meant to attack or critique the use of 
sovereignty as a protection for Indian tribes.  The author  acknowledges the to the integral 
important role of sovereignty.    The focus of this comment was to how to bring suit in to federal 
court strictly for the Freedmen of the Seminole and Cherokee tribes.  
 
288 See  Part I supra. See  generally LITTLEFIELD, supra note 7. 
289 See  Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (W.D. Okla. 2002). 
290 See  Seminole Nation of Okla. v Norton, 223 F. Supp. 122, 134 (D.D.C. 2002). 
291 See  Part II supra.
292 See  KEILMAN, supra note 81(quoting Crockett a Freedman descendant “If it wasn’t for the 
money, everybody would be in harmony. When the money came, people started to change.”). 
293 Id. (quoting Lewis Johnson, a member of the Seminole Tribe council, “If someone is not an 
Indian by blood, you can’t make them that way. There is no way you can change what history 
has been, but the Tribe does have an inherent right to determine who are its members.”). 
66
 The current disenfranchisement of the Freedmen is an abuse of the sovereignty. Denying 
people rights based on their ancestors’ prior condition of servitude or property status is a “badge 
or incident of slavery.”294 Congress intended to eradicate such discrimination not only in the 
treaties but also in the enforcement legislation passed within months of the treaties.295 Courts 
have found that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches Native American tribes.296 Therefore, the 
enforcement legislation should also reach them. Such an application will not leave the tribes 
vulnerable to law suits from outsiders trying to sue their way into the tribe, but will assure equal 
treatment for the Freedmen. 
 
294 See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968)(holding that “the badges and incidents of 
slavery” included restraints upon fundamental rights of property) 
295 See  Part V D.1. supra.
296 See  In re Sah Quah 31 F. 327 (D. Ala. 1886). 
